Officer Professional Education 				in the Canadian Forces 				and the Rowley Report, 1969 by Wakelam, Randall
©Historical Studies in Education / Revue d’histoire de l’éducation 16, 2 (2004): 287-314
Officer Professional Education 
in the Canadian Forces 
and the Rowley Report, 1969
Colonel (retired) Randall Wakelam
In the late 1960s the Canadian Military was experiencing a peacetime
upheaval.  The three previously independent Services were being
amalgamated – unified – by political direction.  This meant that previously
independent processes, including professional education, had to be rethought
and reorganized to fit the new single-force philosophy.  Under the leadership
of a battlefield commander, Major-General Roger Rowley, a small team set
out to devise a radical concept for academic and professional education that
would provide officers with a coherent suite of learning programs spanning
their careers, all provided for by an integrated single military-civilian teaching
engine.  The plan immediately met resistance from pre-existing organizations
and, harried by organizational reductions, faded from the scene, even as the
value of enhanced education was receiving general support.  In 2002, with a
renewed focus on intellectual agility, the concept was resurrected with the
establishment of the Canadian Defence Academy.
À la fin des années 1960, en pleine période de paix, les militaires
canadiens vécurent un remaniement. Les trois branches des forces armées,
précédemment indépendantes, furent intégrées, réunifiées, par les autorités
politiques. Cela signifiait que des secteurs d’activités autrefois séparés, dont la
formation professionnelle, devaient être repensés et réorganisés dans l’optique
d’une force armée unifiée. Sous la gouverne d’un commandant de l’armée de
terre, le Major général Roger Rowley, une petite équipe chercha à mettre au
point un tout nouveau concept d’éducation académique et professionnelle qui
fournirait aux officiers un ensemble logique de programmes d’apprentissages
durant leur carrière, tous ces programmes étant fournis par un appareil
éducatif militaro-civil unique intégré. Le projet rencontra la résistance
immédiate des organisations antérieures ; miné par des compressions
structurelles, il disparut alors même que la nécessité d’une éducation plus
relevée recevait un appui généralisé. En 2002, les aptitudes intellectuelles
étant de nouveau au cœur des préoccupations, le concept fut ressuscité à
travers l’établissement de l’Académie de la Défense canadienne. 
On 16 October 1967 General Jean Victor Allard, Chief of
the Defence Staff (CDS), assigned a demanding task to his
newly appointed Chair of the Officer Development Board
(ODB), Major-General Roger Rowley.  He wanted Rowley and
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his team to sort out officer education for the Canadian Forces.1
As part of its mandate the ODB was to plan for and make
“recommendations on the most effective manner in which the
development of our officers can be co-ordinated, and to define
the responsibilities of the agency best suited to exercise control
over the academies, colleges and other institutions responsible
for this development.”2   Other functions of the Board included
defining officer professional development requirements and
teaching organizations to cover the full gambit of needs of
officer cadets through to general and admirals.   As well, the
team was to prepare transition plans and identify resource
requirements. 
Rowley’s response, presented in some 500 pages of the
formal Report of the Officer Development Board, was endorsed
by Allard on 3 March 1969.  The document laid out a scheme for
the rationale, educational content, courses of study, transition to,
and governance of a Canadian Forces officer development
system.  At the heart of it was a coherent suite of academic and
professional development activities conducted by a military
university, the Canadian Defence Education Centre (CDEC),
with an integrated military-civilian faculty.3
Rowley had made no secret that it would take a full decade
before the impact of the recommendations would result in a fully
effective officer professional development system,4 but
throughout the preparation of the study Allard had seemed well
satisfied with the concept.5  Rowley’s CDEC would replace the
existing military and staff colleges6 and would provide officers
with all their education and professional development needs
from baccalaureate degrees to interdepartmental national
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security courses.7  The Centre would be unique in how it dealt
with pre- and post-commissioning (pre- and in-service) officer
education.  Unlike other nations with their autonomous navy,
army, and air force cadet, staff, and war colleges, the CDEC’s
two-star commander would report directly to Allard and would
be accountable for all officer education policy, plans, and
programs.8  It would therefore be a line organization, with a
formally appointed commander who had both the responsibility
to the profession to provide the needed programs, and the
authority and resources to get the job done.  This commander
would discharge a function that in Canada had previously been
managed by individual service staffs and lesser commanders.  
The context of Rowley’s study was the Cold War world of
the 1960s.  As well, the Canadian military was in the throes of
politically mandated Integration and Unification that would lead
to the creation of a single unified military service on 1 February
1968.   Officer education – alternatively called professional
development – was an important instrument in preparing military
professionals for the uncertainties of the Cold War reality, not
just in Canada but in the U.S. as well.  There the Services gave
new officers undergraduate degrees as an intellectual foundation
for future development, while the highest levels of professional
education were designed to give officers the competencies
needed to advise government on matters of national security.9
Both nations’ systems were built on long-standing European
models such as the German Kriegsacademie, the French cadet
schools, and the British Imperial Defence College.  These
countries and others in Europe operated systems that, as
described by the Report’s annexes, embodied the three levels of
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officer education.10  Implicitly, and often explicitly, these
national systems indicated that the profession of arms required a
unique professional development system that would give
personnel the necessary skills and knowledge to discharge their
service responsibilities effectively.  In reviewing both the
strategic context and the professional development philosophies
of other nations, Rowley concluded that higher levels of
education were the norm given the increasing complexity of
military operations and defence issues.11 
The civilian professions have also had their own unique but
not dissimilar systems of preparing aspirants.  In Professional
Gentlemen, which examines professions and professional
education in nineteenth-century Ontario, R.D. Gidney and W.P.J.
Millar argue that professional education focuses not just on the
“learning about” but also on the fundamentally important
“learning how.”12  Gidney and Millar explore how the three
traditional professions – divinity, medicine and law – recognized
that this technical proficiency had to be accompanied by a liberal
education, which remained “the touchstone of the educated man:
it constituted a training in character and culture, the necessary
prerequisite to framing technical expertise within ‘scientia’…”13
Scientia – knowledge – was thus a fundamental component of
the individual’s formation, giving the professional the ability to
examine issues within a wider intellectual framework, while at
the same time conferring a certain social status both on the
individual and the profession.  Recently, similar conclusions
have been reached by Eliot Freidson in Professionalism: The
Third Logic, in which he argues that all training, whether for
craft, technical, or professional work, involves some degree of
vocational training; but professions benefit from the broadening
experience normally associated with a university milieu and
approach to learning.14  
While these works do not consider the question of military
professionalism in any depth, other researchers have pursued that
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topic.  For example, in The Soldier and the State, Samuel
Huntington, a Harvard academic and recently the author of The
Clash of Civilizations, argued that an officer’s associated duties
included preparing the force, planning its mission, and directing
its actions.  An officer’s skill was neither “craft” nor “art.”  “It is
instead an extraordinarily complex intellectual skill requiring
comprehensive study and training.”  In Huntington’s view,
acquiring this intellect required about one third of an officer’s
career.  Mastery came not simply through “learning existing
techniques.  [Professional competency] is in a continuous
process of development, and it is necessary for the officer to
understand this development and to be aware of its main
tendencies and trends.”  Even this was not enough, for
Huntington posited that the officer must be in tune with the
culture in which he operated.  This required an understanding of
society, of the characteristics of other professions, and of human
beings themselves.15  Huntington’s military professional thus
needed to acquire and maintain a broad and complex expertise in
order to “manage violence” on behalf of society and the state.  
I begin this study with a brief review of the main elements
of post-commissioning professional development in Canada’s
three Services prior to unification.  I then turn to the Rowley
Report and highlight some of its seminal recommendations.  One
cannot help but be impressed with the scope, depth, and
decisiveness of this document.  I also look at the institutional
politics that led to the abandonment of much of the structure that
was intended to act as an educational anchor during changes in
administrations and defence policies, and show how some of the
professional programs survived, but how much of the co-
ordination that was necessary did not come into being.  I
conclude by jumping ahead some twenty-five years to a point
where the Canadian Forces has again found itself in transition.
Here, the end of the Cold War and several examples of flawed
performance have precipitated a series of reviews of education
parameters.  The recent solutions to these challenges have seen
what is arguably a re-creation of Rowley’s vision.  
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PRIOR TO INTEGRATION and unification the three Services each
carried out professional development in their own fashion.16
Each Service conducted its own training in technical and tactical
procedures, using a variety of schools and establishments.  The
officer cadet or military colleges were separate from the “staff
training colleges,” which included the Canadian Army and Royal
Canadian Air Force (RCAF) staff colleges.  At the staff college
level both the Army and the Air Force concentrated on the
employment of large forces and on the strategic settings in which
forces were used.  The Navy sent a small number of students to
the Royal Navy Staff College and also to the RCAF program, but
did not operate its own institution.  
From the end of the Second World War until 1967, the
Army conducted its own two-year Canadian Army Staff College
at Fort Frontenac in Kingston.  The course was reduced to one
year in length at that point, but even the cut-down version
offered an impressive scope.  Describing the program in the
College’s journal, Snowy Owl, the Commandant, Brigadier
General W.A. Milroy, stated that students would graduate with a
“thorough understanding of the principles and techniques” of
land operations, including “specialized staff skills, a knowledge
of military management, and the functions of the staff.”  The
latter included logical and critical thinking as well as
communications skills.  Graduates would also gain a grasp of
national security issues in their broadest sense.  Finally, the
course would include ample opportunity for the practice of staff
skills in solving “typical command and staff problems
encountered in war and situations short of war throughout the
world, with emphasis on the divisional level and below.”17  In
sum, the Army conducted a program clearly oriented to
developing staff officers for employment with large battlefield
organizations while at the same time offering a glimpse at the
geo-political roots of defence and a grounding in critical
thinking.
The Army published a pair of articles in the Canadian Army
Journal in 1963 that offered some insight into the courses of its
sister services.  The articles, according to its editor, (then)
Colonel Milroy, were in response to the growing interchange of
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officers undergoing professional development as a result of the
integration of the three Services.  For example, the Air Force
contingent on the Army staff course had grown from two officers
to ten, while the Navy increased the number of participants from
one to two.18   The articles were thus intended to tell Army
officers more about professional education in the other services;
more significantly, they also served to highlight the differences
in professional development philosophies between the three.
The article on the “training” of naval officers dealt uniquely with
junior officer training.  Written by the junior-ranked Staff
Officer, Training Publications from the Directorate of Naval
Training, the piece concentrated on the complexities of life at sea
for a new member of the Naval Service.  The focus of the article
and of the training was on how one became a competent junior
naval officer ready to move on from general employment to
specific advanced duties within a ship’s company.19  Those
aware that the Navy did in fact send senior officers to attend the
Royal Navy Staff College in England and the Royal Canadian
Air Force program in Toronto might perhaps have been surprised
or even concerned that the article made no mention of this higher
level of professional development.  
A prior issue of the Canadian Army Journal had included a
similar piece on “professional education” in the RCAF.20  The
contrast between the Navy’s emphasis on job-related training
and the Air Force’s focus on broad education was immediately
evident to someone comparing the two articles.  The Air Force
approach concentrated on the career development that took place
after the officer was technically competent for a particular “trade
specialty” such as pilot, supply officer, or air traffic controller.
Their professional education system provided officers with the
cognitive skills and in-depth knowledge necessary to make
reasoned decisions and to function in large multi-dimensional
organizations where co-ordinating the efforts of peers and
subordinates would be a central function.  Overall, the Air Force
content was not much different from that of the Army, but there
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was a significantly different approach to the management of
professional development.
A key theme of the Air Force article was the fundamental
importance of the control and co-ordination of education
programs. Having recognized the value of professional
education, in the 1940s and 50s the Air Force had established a
number of courses and programs, but these had not been co-
ordinated.  The article’s author, Wing Commander Murray,
commented that “because [the delivering] agencies developed
more or less independently there was a danger that such
education was being carried out in a piecemeal fashion.  By 1958
it became clear that to ensure proper span of control and
effective policy direction, one single agency was required to
provide unified control in the field of professional education.”21  
These few words described what had been a fairly lengthy
and perhaps not too harmonious process of reining-in the Air
Force’s professional education programs.  In June 1958 the
RCAF Staff College Board of Governors had recommended the
establishment of a committee “to review professional education
in the RCAF.”22  On 29 September such a panel was authorized
by the Vice-Chief of the Air Staff (VCAS), who charged them to
examine “the implications of coordinating the existing agencies
of professional education in the RCAF.”23  Reporting back
within sixty days the committee stated that
a professional education process can be composed of a
number of courses, examinations, and other instructional
agencies.  But as all contribute to a single aim and exist to
fulfill this aim, the coordination between all agencies is
essential.   The best coordination would be provided by
having all agencies of education controlled by a commander
with that responsibility alone.24
Expressing this notion more forcefully in its conclusion, the
committee, wrote that “the process of educating is…done
piecemeal and cannot be anything but inefficient, uneconomical,
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and inadequate.”25  The proposed solution for this situation was
the creation of an RCAF Air University that would ensure
“unified control and continuous coordination” and hence the
“most suitable and efficient means of RCAF professional
education today and in the future.”26
In June 1959 the Vice Chief convened another senior level
conference at the RCAF Staff College in Toronto to review the
process of establishing what was by then being called the Air
Force College.27  The Vice Chief opened the session by stating
that the Air Council, the RCAF’s senior policy body, had
approved the new college, but that it had “not been definite” on
governance arrangements.  He was therefore asking for opinions
on whether the College should come under the Air-Officer-
Commanding Training Command or if it should report directly
to Air Force HQ.  Air Vice Marshal Bryan, commander of
Training Command, supported the first option, but the Chief of
Training at AFHQ, Air Commodore Lister, “found it difficult to
see how [Training Command] could be expected effectively to
set the standards and, at the same time, supervise the training and
assess the results.”  The minutes record that the Vice Chief
closed the discussion on the command and control of the Air
College by stating that it had not been intended to come to any
firm decisions, but merely to explore the matter.28  Clearly,
however, there had been a desire to find a means of grouping
professional education under one organization, and the fact that
senior commanders and staff could not find a consensus on how
to proceed is indicative of the complexity and uniqueness of the
question.
By 1961 an umbrella structure, the Air Force College, had
been activated, and its staff members were busy trying to define
the optimum structure to provide for a Staff College, Staff
School, planning and research activities, and, eventually, an
extension program.  A small team produced a comprehensive
study; its comments on planning and co-ordination of curriculum
reflect the nature of the challenge:
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The activities of defining the basic professional syllabus, of
developing study requirements for individual courses, and
for planning changes to the education system are all
intimately related to research and study of the professional
field of knowledge.  Yet these activities are all coordinating
activities in the sense that they determine the relationship of
one course to another within the education system, and that
they show a need for change or the establishment of new
courses.  Thus it seems unwise to separate coordination or
education system planning as distinct administrative
functions which can be performed by administrative
methods divorced from a knowledge of the syllabus and a
close familiarity with the instructional methods available.29
Given the complex interconnection between program
requirements and course content, the study recommended that
the Air Force College headquarters should be responsible for a
variety of tasks, including “developing RCAF educational
concepts, policies, plans and programs; developing Air Force
College operating policies; helping develop, and approving,
program outlines; and carrying out advanced syllabus and
doctrine research.”30  At the same time detailed course
development and syllabus planning would be the tasks of the
Staff College and Staff School.  In short, the study recommended
that while the headquarters would establish broad learning goals
and the policies and procedures needed for achieving them, the
daily planning and delivery of the curricula should fall on those
organizations charged with those tasks.  This philosophy of
centralized control, still not perfected by the Air Force, was to
have a major influence in defining officer education for the
Canadian Forces. 
The newly legislated Canadian Forces of the late 1960s was
thus a force with three distinct officer professional development
systems that, to a significant degree, lacked a common
philosophy and process.  Between them they covered a spectrum
from practical training to broad conceptualization of defence and
security issues.  There was a requirement to harmonize and
economize, while at the same time ensuring effective, co-
ordinated professional development.  This was Rowley’s task. 
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ACCORDING TO A SENIOR member of the Board, Rowley gave his
team carte-blanche so that they could develop a solution to the
problem based on a complete review of requirements and
options.31  Rowley’s own background no doubt contributed to his
desire for a full investigation.  A graduate of Dalhousie
University, he had joined a militia regiment, the Cameron
Highlanders of Ottawa, in his hometown in 1933.  Mobilized
during the war, he served as a Commandant of the Canadian
Army Battle School in the UK and Commanding officer of the
Stormont, Dundas, and Glengarry Highlanders in combat in
France and Germany.  After the war Rowley attended both the
British Army Staff College and the British Imperial Defence
College, in 1947 and 1953 respectively.  He commanded 2
Canadian Infantry Brigade in Germany and was Commandant of
the Canadian Army Command and Staff College from 1958 to
1962.32  Now in his last appointment before mandatory
retirement at age 55, Rowley allowed his staff the “freedom to
adventure” and they developed a fairly radical alternative to the
patchwork of schools and courses then in operation.  In place of
the existing matrices they proposed a single “officer factory,”
and a small number of subsidiaries, which would offer a series of
co-ordinated education and professional development programs
and courses designed to take an officer from enrolment through
to employment at the most senior ranks.
Rowley began by defining an officer and an officer corps in
a Canadian context; then he defined a professional development
system for them.  Coming up with acceptable definitions of the
military professional was undoubtedly challenging for there was
considerable debate going on, particularly in the U.S., on this
very issue.33  Adding the particular Canadian dimensions of
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small middle power, peacekeeping, and unification of the
services served to complicate the task further.  After extensive
research and synthesis the Board developed a model of officer
qualities that included:  
• the soldierly virtues (classic qualities including
loyalty, honour and courage; in short, a professional
ethos)
• command ability (the ability to command groups of
subordinates commensurate with rank)
• branch and specialty skill (infantry, aerospace
engineer, logistician, etc)
• list competence (the ability to employ large forces for
sea, land, air, or support operations; at this level
officers would not be expected to be expert in other
than their own ‘list’)
• military expertise (knowledge of the capabilities of
armed forces, both domestic and foreign, and an
ability to provide strategic level military advice to
government)
• intellectual capability (native intelligence for use in
grasping concepts, reasoning logically, and solving
problems)
• executive ability (capacity to deal with problems and
decisions that “defy solution”)
• military-executive ability (the context in which the
officer will apply his executive ability and military
expertise and give his advice to government)
Rowley saw these qualities interacting to varying degrees at
different points in an officer’s career.  For example, specialty
skills, such as commanding an infantry platoon, became less
important as an officer advanced in rank, while at the same time
military-executive ability, at its highest level the ability to advise
government on matters of national security, would be vital for a
general or admiral.34  Whether these qualities were unique to the
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Canadian military or to militaries generally, or whether they
were more broadly applicable to all professions (with reference
to the military replaced by other professional competencies) is
certainly an intriguing question.  What appears reasonably
certain is that Rowley had found a way to summarize inclusively
the qualities common to all officers in the Canadian context. 
From this identification of officer qualities the Board was
then able to derive a series of “guiding precepts” for an officer
development system.  Among other things, the new system was
to:
• prepare officers to contribute to a Canadian national
strategy
• impart the Canadian military ethic
• remain in consonance with scientific, technological,
sociological, economic, educational, military, and
strategic changes
• accept the baccalaureate as the basic educational level
for entry to the officer corps
• ensure that courses taught at the military college are
relevant to the technical and operational requirements
of the military
• provide the appropriate professional-development
course material at the right stage to assist the officer
in the orderly development of the qualities demanded
of him at succeeding levels
• encourage original research on military matters
within the officer corps
• permit no degradation of operational effectiveness
To attain these aims the system must, in addition, be
efficiently organized, well integrated and effectively
commanded.35
Rather than perpetuate the web of existing organizations that
reported directly to the national headquarters, the ODB proposed
that one organization, the Canadian Defence Education Centre
(CDEC), be established to develop policy, make plans, and
conduct programs and courses on behalf of the military.  At the
policy and planning level the CDEC headquarters would analyze
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Canadian Forces’ needs and develop policies and plans to
provide the necessary education and professional development to
meet those needs.  At the operating level the CDEC would in
effect be a university with two colleges:  the Canadian Defence
College (CDC),offering in-service professional development to
commissioned officers, and the Canadian Military College
(CMC), providing undergraduate and graduate education.  
This university would have the ability to design and
implement education and professional development programs
derived from the competencies defined by the national
headquarters.  Having grouped the resources of the former cadet
and staff colleges into one entity, all located at Rockcliffe in
Ottawa’s east end, CDEC would have the institutional depth and
flexibility to adjust to new tasks without significant changes to
organization.  The programs to be conducted by CDEC would
include undergraduate degrees, graduate degrees, a Junior Staff
Course, a Junior Command and Staff Course (Land), academic
extension courses, a preparatory (pre-Command and Staff
Course) studies program, a Command and Staff Course, and an
Advanced Military Staff Course.  CDEC would also operate a
library for use by all students and faculty and a wargaming
facility for use by Defence College courses.36
There were to be two other major delivery agencies for
officer professional development. The first organization was the
National Security Course (NSC), which would replace the
National Defence College (a body operated directly by Ottawa,
offering a ten-month program of national security studies for
senior military, government, and private-sector executives), but
have roughly the same mandate.  Rowley saw the NSC as a pan-
government program, dealing, as did its predecessor, with the
overall security of the nation and not just defence matters.  A
Centre for Security Studies would be created to conduct research
both in support of the NSC as well as the strategic studies
components of other courses and programs.37  The second
delivery organization, described only briefly in the Report, was
the Canadian Military Academy (CMA).  While not depicted in
organization charts it was described as the facility that would
deal with the Officer Candidate Training Plan – a program for
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non-degreed officer production that would eventually be phased
out.38 
Within the CDEC the Canadian Military College would
offer a range of arts, sciences, and engineering degrees based on
service needs.  The college would operate twelve months a year
to maximize efficiency.  Year-round classes would also allow
one- third of the student body to undergo military training at all
times; thus all students would benefit from having been in the
field during all seasons of the year by the time they were ready
to join their first unit.39  The proposal looked not unlike the
University of Waterloo’s now-renowned and widely adopted co-
operative education program.  
Once commissioned, an officer entered a normalized
professional development path that would take him through a
series of courses based on rank.  Here perhaps it should be
mentioned that in the military lexicon a course can be as short as
a two-day defensive driving qualification or as long as the ten-
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month Command and Staff Course with over, 1,000 curriculum
hours.  The courses, all taught at the CDC (except the NSC), can
be summarized as follows:
• Junior Staff Course – “at captain level to teach
unified junior military staff procedures of a general
nature”
• Junior Command and Staff Course (Land) – “[at
captain level] for land force officers to teach
operational staff procedures”
• Command and Staff Course – “at the major level
basically to impart list [sea, land or air] competence”
• Advanced Military Studies Course – “at the
lieutenant-colonel level to broaden list competence
and emphasize military expertise, particularly through
the study of high-level military operations”
• National Security Course – “to develop to the fullest
extent possible an awareness of the national and
international environment and thus to impart military-
executive ability”40
While these courses would impart knowledge and to some extent
skills, “the policy of making the courses sufficiently demanding
to help build intellectual ability and executive ability is
recognized.  Emphasis on the military virtues including
leadership is recognized throughout.”41  In other words the
professional development process would emphasize not just
skills and knowledge, but also the cultivation of logical and
ethical thought.  Additionally, post-commissioning learning
“must [include] a post-graduate programme…[fulfilling service
needs for special and non-specialist officers] with a fairly
extensive understanding in one or other of the many disciplines
that are part of the corpus of knowledge that the military
profession embraces.”42  Together the content, intellectual rigour,
and ethical context would contribute to the formation of military
professionals.
If one thought of the Education Centre’s mandate in terms of
the provision of post-secondary academic and professional
education suited for the military needs of the 1970s, then the
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“product line” covered all requirements.  There was a wide range
of undergraduate options and a variety of post-graduate
qualifications tailored to Service requirements; together these
provided a strong intellectual development for the officer corps.
As well, there was a full suite of professional “management”
courses that would ensure that individuals were well prepared for
the challenges of rank and appointment as they advanced
through their careers.  What appeared to make Rowley’s
approach superior to the patchwork of single-service programs
was the single and co-ordinated strategy that CDEC would take
on behalf of the entire Canadian Forces.  While there was no
attempt to conduct tightly constrained prescriptive professional
education where one size would be forced on all, the system
would ensure that officers progressed through a common
development system regardless of their occupation or branch of
service.
DESPITE ITS PROFESSIONAL development mandate the Canadian
Defence Education Centre was still a military organization in
terms of structure and hierarchy.  The Commander, a two-star
line officer, was responsible to the Chief of Defence Staff.  In
this, the Officer Development Board sought to break away from
previous structures where professional education organizations
were buried within personnel or training staffs and instead
institute a framework akin to those in most major nations where
professional development was considered essential to sustaining
the Service.43 Within the CDEC the Commander would direct the
two colleges, which would each have a one-star commandant.
The CDEC would include a robust headquarters tailored to the
task of organizing and operating the officer professional
development system for the Canadian Forces.44 
Recognizing that this military organization would function
much like a civilian university, the proposed control elements of
CDEC were intended to replicate a post-secondary structure.
The Board recommended the creation of a Deputy for Education,
the post to be filled by a senior academic from one of the three
former military colleges (Royal Military College in Kingston,
Royal Roads Military College in Victoria, and Collège Militaire
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Royale de St-Jean, just south of Montreal).45 As well, because
the CDEC would offer undergraduate and graduate degrees, it
was planned to use RMC’s provincially granted charter and to
incorporate the RMC senate structure, but with amendments to
its jurisdiction to include the Defence College, Military College,
and Military Academy.46 
In order to deal with professional needs of the academic
staff, such as promotion and tenure, a Faculty Review
Committee was proposed.  It would operate under the auspices
of the Deputy Minister of National Defence (with responsibility
for all public servants within the Department) and would, like
the new senate, expand the previous military colleges’ faculty
review functions to include academic staff working at the CMC,
CDC, and CMA.  With pan-CDEC responsibility the
Committee’s chair would be the military Chief of Staff of
CDEC.47
The Officer Development Board also recommended the
formation of an Educational Council based largely on the pre-
existing Canadian Military Colleges’ Council; the new body
would be chaired by the Deputy for Education.  Its primary
function would be to make recommendations about the programs
to be implemented within the system.  Its duties would include
advising the Commander on issues to take before the CDS and
Armed Forces Council (the senior military policy body),
including “Coordination of courses of the CDC, CMC and CMA
to ensure uniformity and sequence in the development
process.”48
It was evident that Rowley had made a fairly conscious
decision to set up CDEC’s working philosophy along university
lines, but with key roles for members of the profession of arms.
To have a military chair for a committee concerned with faculty
advancement and a civilian chair presiding over a body
mandated to assess the officer corps’ education requirements
must have been seen as radical.  Finally, the ODB recommended
that the existing RMC Advisory Board be expanded to include
responsibility for those academic programs offered under the
Defence College.  The Advisory Board would report to the
Minister of National Defence, thus ensuring that the elected head
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of the Department of National Defence would have both
feedback on the activities of the military’s professional
development system and an independent source of advice on
education matters in general.  This weaving together of
responsibilities could have been seen as a system of checks and
balances, but another more positive interpretation would be to
view this as a strengthening process contributing to a common
understanding of the role of professional education and the
mechanisms to ensure its success.  The structure was then and
remains today unique among NATO nations, where the rule
generally is to split academically oriented military colleges,
which may operate like a university, from staff and war colleges,
which until recently have provided professional education
without academic credit or recognition.
DESPITE Allard’s endorsement of the Report in March 1969, and
his overall support for the ODB’s proposals, the Canadian
Defence Education Centre was not activated.  Instead, a similar
construct – the Canadian Defence Education Establishments
(CDEE) – was created on 1 January 1970.  Rather than having
his teaching units located with his headquarters, Milroy, now
appointed as Commander CDEE following Rowley’s departure
on reaching compulsory retirement age, would control the
existing organizations from offices in Ottawa.  According to
Milroy the shift from CDEC to CDEE was made based on his
own recommendation in view of the realpolitik of events in
Ottawa.  The defence establishment in the city and the nation
was shrinking and timing was therefore ill-suited for the creation
of a new and highly visible organization in the capital.  As well,
after a meeting with defence minister Leo Cadieux, he came
away with a clear understanding of the power of the three
existing military colleges.  He had also developed his own
appreciation of the value of keeping the three colleges open for
regional visibility and cadet recruiting.49  
The CDEC concept had come under attack, largely from the
military colleges, almost as soon as Allard signed the report.
Professor Richard Preston, a historian at the Royal Military
College at the time of the Report, has documented the demise of
the Board’s vision from that college’s perspective. Co-location
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and amalgamation hit a raw nerve with RMC advocates, who
were soon arguing that the ODB had miscalculated costs.
Preston attributed the problems to the ODB’s development of an
“ideal system…without regard to its cost.”50  He noted that in his
memoirs Allard blamed these problems on Rowley’s deputy,
Brigadier General B.J. Guimond, who had added the military
colleges’ mandate and budget to the CDEC when there had been
no authority to do so.51  And yet the ODB’s terms of reference
called for exactly the comprehensive scheme it had devised:  the
Board’s first task dealt with entry programs and its fourth remit
involved the creation of the necessary control and co-ordination
mechanisms for officer development.52  In any case Allard’s
criticism is perhaps moot since he had approved the report and
its recommendations when, if anyone, he had had the authority to
reject the proposal.  The ODB had presented a plan for a co-
ordinated and effective officer professional development system
that included a better control over the various colleges and
schools.  There were costs involved, but there were also benefits.
As Motiuk recalls, opponents to the plan were disingenuous in
presenting their costing concerns, adding in operating costs for
fifteen years, costs that would have been borne by any
professional development system.53
Preston also argued that Prime Minister Trudeau’s re-
articulation of defence priorities, one month after the ODB
Report was issued, cast doubt upon the Board’s defence policy
premises.   He felt that the authors’ focus on “Pearsonian
internationalism made their report seem out of line with
Trudeau’s concern for Canada and North America.”54  Preston
claimed that this caused the Report to lose “political credibility.”
Surely, though, such shifts in defence policy and force
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employment were just the sorts of things that the Board had been
thinking of when it had articulated the need for long-term
integrity and continuity.55  Just because the defence policy of the
nation changed, one should not have assumed, not that the
CDEC concept was wrong, but rather that the focus of some of
the educational programs would need review and perhaps
adjustment.  To suggest, as Preston appeared to imply, that the
professional development system would need to be revised every
time the government changed its security and defence priorities
seems unimaginable.  As Larry Motiuk commented at the time,
in a Canadian Institute of International Affairs paper:  “Courses
could be instituted or dropped as the occasion warranted without
changing the basic role of the establishment.”56
Despite the participation on the ODB by Dean Tom
Hutchinson of RMC, his faculty colleagues felt some discomfort
with the proposed Canadian Military College.57  One can only
presume that their unease would have included everything from
possible loss of seniority to the problems of family relocation.
The RMC commandant, Commodore Hayes, considered
reporting to a two-star commander to be a step down from his
previous letter of appointment from the CDS.58  Much of 1970
was spent in discussion and debate as to what committees and
boards were needed to regulate the policies and practices of
RMC.59  While Preston attributed the decision not to co-locate
the three military colleges, and the subsequent abandonment of a
year-round undergraduate program, to financial considerations,
the decision would surely have been influenced to some degree
by this political wrangling.  Indeed, Motiuk  has indicated that
detractors were hacking away at the Report from the moment it
was tabled.60  
It would appear from Allard’s memoirs and Preston’s
commentary that the proposed amalgamation of the existing
military colleges within the CDEC structure, with the resulting
loss of identity and physical presence, had been too much for the
faculty and, one suspects, the alumni to bear.  As institutions go,
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and particularly institutions such as RMC with long and proud
histories, opposition to such a radical proposal was to be
expected.  
DESPITE CRITICISM of the ODB concept and the less-than-
optimal structure, the CDEE was soon able to champion some
issues.  The expansion of facilities at the three military colleges
in conjunction with the shift to the degreed officer corps concept
of the ODB was described in an article in Canadian Defence
Quarterly by RMC’s Director of Cadets at the end of 1971.61
The new post-commissioning Professional Development System
was the subject of another article by National Defence
Headquarters’ Director of Education.  The system would consist
of a Junior Staff Course, a Junior Command and Staff Course
(Land), and a Command and Staff Course.  Those destined for
senior appointments would have an opportunity to attend the
National Defence College; however, unlike Rowley’s model
there would be no Advanced Military Studies Course.  The
author explained the philosophy behind the programs:  they
would impart both knowledge of the profession and at the same
time the skills needed to properly employ that knowledge –
“research, organized thinking, problem solving and the process
of expressing [one’s thoughts] orally or in writing.”  The
system’s purpose was “thus clearly revealed.  It is to broaden
progressively a career officer’s perception of his place in the
military profession and the professions’ role in society.”62  From
this one can see that, while not having the physically centralized
and rationalized organization recommended by Rowley, there at
least existed a coherent series of courses and programs
approximating the ODB’s vision, the whole under the control of
one commander.  Compared to the pre-unification mix of
training and education philosophies, this new system was a
significant improvement.
The Canadian Defence Quarterly also provided a venue for
criticism.  If there was a common focus to the contrary
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commentary that began to appear as early as 1971 it was one of
concern for the profession of arms and for the lack of
professional development policy:  what sorts of courses, for
whom, when, why?   Indeed the second issue of the resurrected
journal included two such articles written by young officers.63
Expressing his concern that the profession was out of touch with
the nation, Captain P.S. Bury stated:  “It is significant that in
John Porter’s The Vertical Mosaic [1965], considered a
definitive study of modern Canadian society, there is no mention
of the Services.  It appears that the serviceman’s status in the
eyes of his masters, the public, is not necessarily low, but rather
irrelevant.”64  Ironically, the CDEC, embodying the ODB
philosophy of preparing officers to understand socioeconomic
trends and overseeing courses covering such topics as elements
of national power, formulation of defence policy, and Canadian
internal issues,65 would have addressed this problem head on.  A
second article attacked the Post-Graduate Training program.
How could the military keep young officers with Master’s
degrees interested when job satisfaction and working conditions
conspired to have them head for the professions associated with
their graduate qualifications?  Surely, argued the author, himself
a retired Captain, it would be better to invest this advanced
education in those mid-career officers who intended making the
Forces their profession.  Acknowledging the ODB concept of
post-graduate education and proposals for master’s credits based
on professional education, the author nonetheless left the clear
impression that he was unhappy with much of the post-graduate
philosophy.66  
By the end of 1974 five other articles had appeared
criticizing various aspects of professional education.  Junior
officers, one said, required some form of assistance in
undertaking mandated professional self-improvement.67  There
were concerns that pre-commissioning officer production had
lost its way, with RMC becoming nothing more than a university
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giving whatever degrees suited the professorial cadre, regardless
of the Canadian Forces’ requirements.68  There was no
professional development between the basic officer course and
the Staff School; officers needed something “to remedy a
worsening situation.”69 A final pair of commentaries zeroed in on
the Regular Officer Training Plan, suggesting that the
sequencing of education, operational training, and initial
operational employment was all wrong.70  
Clearly there were some disgruntled “students” who might
have been happier with the CDEC concept.  Undoubtedly even
the ODB model would have suffered some growing pains in the
early years, but with one commander and an effective
organization that concentrated decisions on policy, plans, and
operations firmly within a small group of experienced military
and civilian educators, one can reasonably assume that
satisfaction among the officer corps would have been more
prevalent.   That was certainly what the ODB’s vision of  “one
officer factory” had been intended to foster.
Concerns from “customers” and infighting among
“stakeholders” would not seem completely unpredictable:  the
Canadian military was in the middle of a massive institutional
reorganization.  This said, one is repeatedly struck by the fact
that a well-mandated, strategically supported CDEC could at
least have faced these problems squarely with the knowledge
that it was working with a good plan and the authority and
accountability to get on with the necessary changes.  But by the
end of 1972 there was neither a CDEC nor a CDEE.  Instead, a
Directorate of Professional Education and Development
(DPED), run by a colonel, had been created to handle the
national level administration of the military and staff colleges.
This staff organization was to report through two intermediaries,
the Director General Recruiting Education and Training and the
Chief of Personnel Development, to the Assistant Deputy
Minister for Personnel – one-, two-, and three-star officers
respectively.  The latter would “command and control” the
various institutions, chair the Educational Council, and have
Officer Professional Education and the Rowley Report 311
71 Preston, To Serve Canada, 123.
72 The author worked in the neighbouring Directorate of Language Training from 1989
to 1991 as the section head responsible for language training policies, plans, and
operations.  
73 Interview with LGen. (retd.) F.R. Sutherland, Feb. 2001.
74 Canada, Department of National Defence, Report of the Officer Development
Review Board (Ottawa: DND, 1995). The Chair of the ODRB was Lieutenant-General
Robert Morton.  Canada, Department of National Defence, The Officer Professional
Development Working Group Final Report (Toronto:  DND, 1996). The Chair of the
Working Group was Commodore K.A. Nason.
75 Hon. M. Douglas Young.  Report  to  the  Prime Minister  on  the  Leadership 
and  Management of  the Canadian Forces,  25 Mar. 1997,
http://www.forces.gc.ca/eng/min/reports/PM/mnd.60.html; accessed 2 July 2002.
overall responsibility for education and professional
development policy.71 Despite this apparent top-down approach,
in practice many of the policy initiatives either came from staff
officers or originated in the colleges.72  This approach meant that
busy senior officers, burdened with high volumes of minutiae,
were not well positioned to deal with professional development
issues.  Moreover, these generals, caught in staff rather than line
appointments, often found themselves without the necessary
authority to make decisions and issue direction.73 This less-than-
optimal system, as it existed in 1972, was to remain relatively
intact until the mid-1990s.
One is left to wonder whether more could have been done at
the time to ensure the success of officer professional
development.  If one accepts the tumultuous reorganization of
the services into one unified force, the desires of politicians and
senior commanders to downsize the military footprint in Ottawa,
the aspirations of the military colleges to continue their
traditional mandates and programs, and the general lack of
support for the Canadian Forces by government in the early
1970s, then the system that was created and operated seems,
perhaps, the best that might have been hoped for.  
DURING THE 1990s and continuing into the new millenium, the
Canadian Forces and Canadian governments have sought to deal
with a number of crises and challenges to the officer corps.
Precipitated largely by the peace dividend and the errors of
Somalia, the CF first reviewed officer professional development
issues through studies and boards74 and then by the direction of
the Minister of National Defence.75  Plans began to take form in
the 1996-98 period with changes to senior officer education,
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including two new courses commencing in 1998 (the Advanced
Military Studies Course and the National Security Studies
Course).76  A proposal for major reforms to officer entry
schemes, the Enhanced Leadership Model, calling for more
leadership and values inculcation and a mandatory balanced arts
and science undergraduate program for those entering RMC, was
tabled in 1999.77 The first RMC class to enter under this scheme
graduated in 2004.  Associated with this proposal was the
institution of a degreed-officer corps policy.78  Most recently,
steps have also been taken to allow master’s level credits for the
senior courses, and RMC offered a professional master’s degree
(Master of Defence Studies) in conjunction with the Command
and Staff Course for the first time in 2001.79
But these reforms were the result of a number of initiatives
coming from a variety of agencies.  There were many, and some
might argue too many, players in these improvements.  Indeed,
one of the criticisms levelled by the Minister’s Monitoring
Committee on Change, an organization established by the
Minister in 1997 to confirm the implementation of directed
change strategies, was that there was no firm guidance or policy
in place to ensure an effective overall system.80 
In response to these criticisms and recommendations, work
began in 2001 that led to the establishment of the Canadian
Defence Academy in 2002.  Like the CDEC proposal, the
Academy has one military college and one professional college,
the Royal Military College and the Canadian Forces College
respectively.  Like the CDEC vision, the Commander of the
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CDA is the Force’s “champion for lifelong learning.” And like
the CDEC proposal, CDA has the task of co-ordinating all
common professional development and academic education
across the Canadian Forces.  Like CDEE, the CDA has not
succeeded in grouping all its resources into one location;
however, it has brought its major campuses to within a day’s
drive of its headquarters in Kingston.  And like Allard’s vision
for excellence in education and professional development, the
CDA has the full support of the current Chief of Defence Staff,
General Ray Henault, who, acknowledging the seminal part
played by Rowley, stated in the CDA preliminary Charter:
“Professional development is at the heart of the Profession of
Arms. The CDA will play a vital role in the reform and
transformation of our professional standards and
competencies.”81
BY PROPOSING a unique defence education command, Rowley
sought to focus attention on the fundamental importance of
officer development in ensuring the success of the profession of
arms and by extension the Canadian Forces.  He knew that only
by creating a self-sustaining interest in professional development
could the Canadian officer corps maintain itself as a capable and
credible military profession.  Most of the constituent elements of
Rowley’s programs were instituted and yet the profession
faltered, if only briefly, during the mid-1990s.  While an
explanation for this result cannot be categorically demonstrated,
what may have been missing was a sufficient authority and
responsibility to ensure that the education and professional
development programs remained relevant and that the
knowledge, skills and values that Rowley believed were so
important to the officer corps would be safeguarded and nurtured
through professional education.  Now, more than thirty years
after the ODB completed its work, the Canadian Forces is
returning to Rowley’s philosophies and structures in creating the
Canadian Defence Academy.  Going beyond Rowley’s focus on
officers and recognizing the intellectual challenges of the
modern battlefield, the CDA will champion learning for all
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members of the Canadian Forces.  Yet while the circumstances
and the student body may have evolved, Rowley’s central
message remains as important today as it was then:
It matters little whether the Forces have their present
manpower strength and financial budget, or half of them or
double them; without a properly educated, effectively
trained, professional officer corps the Forces would, in the
future, be doomed to, at the best, mediocrity; at the worst
disaster.82   
 
